Abstract. This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives on the use of foreign-exchange derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies, as end users, over the period 1996-2000. Our data from 252 large bank holding companies allow us to separate derivatives used for purposes other than trading from derivatives used for trading. This unique data set permits the investigation of derivative use in a hedging framework without the elimination of large dealer firms. Additionally, we employ a model suggested by Cragg (1971) that facilitates the examination of the factors underlying the likelihood a firm will use derivatives and the magnitude of foreign-exchange derivatives utilization. We find that managerial incentives determine the decision to use derivatives to hedge, but once managers decide to hedge, firm-specific risk factors determine the amount of derivatives used.
Introduction
One of the unresolved questions associated with the financial decisions of the firm is why firms hedge with derivatives. The conflicts of interest that arise when owners and managers are separate complicate Whidbee and Wohar (1999) eliminate these banks entirely from the sample. Additionally, Carter and Sinkey (1998) and Gunther and Siems (2002) focus on smaller banks with total assets less than $1 billion, since these banks are not likely to be involved as dealers of derivatives. Our data allow us to more cleanly evaluate factors that determine the use of derivatives by end users. In addition, our sample includes the largest banking firms, which are also the most likely to use derivatives.
Second, most studies focus on the relation between various accounting measures and derivatives use by banks (e.g., Carter and Sinkey, 1998; Sinkey and Carter, 2000; and Gunther and Siems, 2002) .
1 In this investigation, we include the effect of managerial incentives with data on executive compensation, director compensation, and ownership structure similar to Whidbee and Wohar (1999) .
Third, we focus on the use of foreign-currency derivatives by BHCs rather than either total derivatives (e.g., Sinkey and Carter, 2000) or interest-rate derivatives (e.g., Carter and Sinkey, 1998; Gunther and Siems, 2002) . Gczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) investigate the use of currency derivatives for non-financial firms and find no relation between managerial incentives and currency-risk hedging. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the use of currency derivatives specifically for hedging by large banking firms.
We find that the size of a banking firm has a strong influence on both the use of foreign-exchange derivatives for hedging and the amount of derivatives that are used. Our results indicate that managerial incentive variables, i.e. manager compensation and institutional ownership, are significant in the decision to use derivatives and firm-specific risk variables, i.e. leverage and foreign exchange exposure, are significant factors in the determination of the amount of derivatives a manager uses. Our results are consistent with the idea that the threat of dismissal by regulatory authorities causes BHC managers to reduce the risk of the firm by hedging in order to protect their investment in human capital and preserve the total value of their compensation package.
The increased risk of dismissal for managers dominates the motivation to increase the value of the put option resulting from deposit insurance by taking more risk, i.e. not hedging.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the theoretical basis of hedging decisions in the firm and the empirical evidence on hedging with derivatives. Section 3 identifies the data sources, defines the variables, and establishes the empirical methods used in the analysis. Section 4 presents our results while Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
The Theory and Evidence on Hedging
2.1. Hedging in Non-Financial Firms. The theoretical literature on hedging by value maximizing, non-financial firms focuses on four rationales for a firm to hedge. These rationales are: 1) to reduce cashflow uncertainty; 2) to reduce the probability of financial distress; 3)
to reduce expected taxes; and 4) to increase debt capacity.
Hedging can increase firm value by reducing the variance of the firm's cash flows. Because of cash flow uncertainty, firms may pursue investment strategies that reduce value because of cash flow uncertainty. One way this can happen is the case of a firm that forgoes investments in positive net present value projects when cash flows are low (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993) . Firms that hedge can reduce the variance of cash flows and thus avoid the problem of underinvestment. Gczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find evidence suggesting that firms use currency derivatives to reduce cash flow variation, allowing them to take advantage of growth opportunities.
A second way hedging can help to maximize firm value is by reducing the probability of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . The firm can reduce the uncertainty of cash flows by hedging, thus reducing the probability of bankruptcy and the costs associated with financial distress. Firms with a higher probability of financial distress would be most likely to benefit from hedging. This implies that firms with greater leverage, and hence a greater probability of experiencing bankruptcy, are more likely to use derivatives to hedge. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) argue that firms hedge because the progressive nature of the U.S. tax code produces a convex relation between a firm's effective tax rate and its pretax income. Firms that hedge can reduce expected tax liabilities by reducing the variability of cash flows. However, Graham and Rogers (2002) find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity.
Finally, Ross (1997) and Leland (1998) find that the most important benefit of debt financing is the tax deductibility of the interest payments. Hedging can reduce the likelihood of low cash flow states leading to default which allows the firm to increase debt capacity and ultimately, the tax benefits of interest deductions (Stulz, 1996) . Graham and Rogers (2002) (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the nature of the relation between the manager's wealth and the value of the firm will determine the incentives managers have to hedge. If the manager's wealth is a concave function of firm value, the manager will have more wealth if the firm hedges while a convex relation between the manager's wealth and firm value would reduce the incentive to hedge (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . The shape of the function of the manager's wealth relative to firm value is determined by the manager's ownership position in the firm, the structure of his compensation, and the extent that managers are disciplined as a result of poor performance (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999) .
Two significant hypotheses come from the arguments of Smith and Stulz (1985) . First, a higher ownership position by managers is predicted to cause greater use of hedging. Second, higher option holdings by managers should result in less hedging. Tufano (1996) finds that a manager that owns more stock options hedges less, while a manager that has more wealth invested in common stock hedges more. He also finds that firms with larger managerial blocks hedge more but those with larger outside blocks hedge less. In a study of the oil and gas exploration and production industry, Meredith (2002) and Wohar, 1999) . Black and Scholes (1973) and Galai and Masulis (1976) show that the common stock of a firm can be viewed as a call option on the assets of the firm. In addition, the subsidy provided by deposit insurance to the bank's owners could be viewed as a put option (Merton, 1977; Marcus and Shaked, 1984; Ronn and Verma, 1986 ).
Thus, risk taking by the banking firm increases the value of both the put option, created by deposit insurance, and the call option on the assets of the firm, associated with equity, so that higher ownership by managers should result in less hedging in banking firms (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999) . This proposition is consistent with the findings of Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) , who find that as bank managers acquire more equity in their firm, the bank becomes riskier.
Whidbee and Wohar (1999) find that BHC managers with incentives more closely aligned with those of the shareholders (i.e., high percentage of CEO shareholdings) are less likely to use derivatives when insider holdings exceed 10 percent. Additionally, they find that if outside directors own larger proportions of the shares, the firm is also less likely to use derivatives. Whidbee and Wohar (1999) interpret these results to mean that BHC managers with large equity holdings take advantage of risk-shifting opportunities due to deposit insurance by not hedging.
Alternatively, they find greater use of derivatives is associated with outside monitoring when insider holdings are less than 10 percent
The motivation for non-financial firms to reduce the probability of financial distress with hedging is less clear for banking firms due to the existence of deposit insurance. The existence of deposit insurance guarantees should mitigate the need for bankruptcy-avoiding hedging strategies. We expect that banking firms with high leverage (lower capital ratios) are less inclined to hedge than non-financial firms with high leverage. Federal deposit guarantees may lessen the need for BHCs to hedge to increase debt capacity. However, regulatory authorities can dismiss bank managers if they take excessive risks which lead to financial distress, unlike the managers of non-financial firms that must be removed by the board of directors. Thus regulatory oversight of the actions of banking firm managers may mitigate, or even dominate, the incentives provided by deposit insurance to hedge less.
Organizational size is an important factor in the decision for a banking firm to hedge because the costs of implementing a risk-management/hedging program using derivatives may keep smaller banks from participating.
The costs include the hiring of skilled personnel and the implementation of internal-control systems necessary to participate in the market for derivatives (Sinkey and Carter, 2000) . Additionally, the maintenance of regulatory capital and meeting of margin requirements are also costs of using derivatives. Prior research documents the difficulty smaller banks have hiring and retaining the skilled employees needed for an effective risk-management program (see Smith and Stolz, 1984) .
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Previous research in the use of derivatives by banks documents the importance of size in banks' use of derivatives (see Koppenhaver, 1990; Kim and Koppenhaver, 1993; and Sinkey and Carter, 2000) . Research on derivative use by non-financial firms also finds a positive relation between derivative use and size (see Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; Mian, 1996; and Gczy, Minton, and Schrand, 1997) . Carter and Sinkey (1998) and Gunther and Siems (2002) , using an empirical framework similar to this study, find that while there is a significant positive relation between size and the likelihood of derivative use, there is a negative relation between size and the extent of derivative use.
The business of banking includes a number of important risk factors (for example, default or credit risk, interest-rate risk, and foreignexchange risk) that may be related to the use of derivatives for hedging purposes. Gczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find that non-financial firms with greater foreign-exchange exposure are more likely to use currency derivatives. Several prior studies find that U.S. banking institutions are exposed to exchange-rate risk (see Choi, Elyasiani, and Kopecky, 1992; Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Choi and Elyasiani, 1997; and Chamberlin, Howe, and Popper, 1997) .
3
Another important factor in how derivatives are used by banks may be the regulatory capital requirements. Presently, risk-based-capital standards require derivative activities by banks to be supported with capital. Merton and Bodie (1992) argue that banks engaging in nontraditional activities need additional capital, i.e. "assurance capital", to cushion losses. However, prior research by Sinkey and Carter (2000) finds no support for this notion, at least with respect to the use of derivatives by banking institutions.
2 Block and Gallagher (1986) find similar results for non-financial firms.
3 Unlike the other studies cited, Martin (2000) does not find that U.S. BHCs are exposed to foreign-exchange risk. She argues that regulatory constraints or risk aversion account for lack of exposure.
Empirical Methods
In this section we discuss the data sources, sample characteristics, the model specification, empirical variables, and the hypotheses tested. Ther reduced form equations could be estimated using 800.
We report descriptive statistics for the sample BHCs used in the regressions in Table 1 . The average size of a BHC in our sample is $23.6
billion with a median of $3.25 billion, indicating a large amount of skewness with respect to size. On average, the percentage of ownership by insiders is 13.1 percent (median = 8.18 percent) and by institutional investors is 27.7 percent (median = 24.3 percent). The mean return on equity is 14.7 percent and the ratio of market value to book value of equity is 2.33 times. Sample BHCs have an average ratio of equity capital to total assets of 8. Koppenhaver, 1990; Kim and Koppenhaver, 1993; and Sinkey and Carter, 2000) . However, the decision to use derivatives may be affected by entirely different factors than the decision as to how much involvement is desired. 4 We use and Sinkey (1998) use a similar framework to investigate the use of interest-rate derivatives by U.S. commercial banks. In this framework, the decision to use derivatives is evaluated using a probit model, while the extent of derivative use is analyzed using a truncated regression The model can be expressed as follows:
Let D * i denote the net benefits to the i th BHC of using foreign exchange derivatives for purposes other than trading. For simplicity, it is assumed that the benefits derived depend linearly on a set of independent variables, x 1i and on another, possibly, endogenous set of variables, w 1i . Thus,
where the e 1i are iidN (0, σ 2 1 ), and β 1 and δ 1 are vectors of unknown parameters. The net benefits of using derivatives in this manner are not directly observed; instead, one only observes whether the BHC decides to use them or not, D i :
which is the standard probit model. Now consider the desired amount of foreign exchange derivative use, A * i . Again, actual usage is observed, and not the desired level. In this case,
where where the e 2i are iidN (0, σ 2 2 ), and β 2 and δ 2 are vectors of unknown parameters. This is the Type I Tobit model. A limitation of the Tobit model is that the decision to use derivatives and the amount used are determined by the same mechanism.
Cragg (Cragg 1971 ) proposes a two-tiered model that contains the usual Tobit model as a special case: With some regressors endogenous, Amemiya's AGLS estimator of probit and Tobit models with endogenous regressors can be used. The software was written for STATA by Joseph Harkness (Harkness 2001) and uses Newey's (Newey 1987) formulae to compute the reported standard errors.
Valid instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variables, but not correlated with the other unobserved determinants of D * i and A * i . Several instruments are available in these data. CEO compensation is likely to be a function of the CEO' human capital (age and experience), and the size and scope of the firm (number of employees, number of offices and subsidiaries). Leverage might also be related to the scope of the firm and GAP, which is the 12-month maturity mismatch.
5 Finally, a dummy variable is created that equals 1 if the BHC earns any foreign interest and is zero otherwise. Ownership by Insiders. When managers have a higher ownership position in the bank, their incentives are more closely aligned with shareholders so they have an incentive to take risk to increase the value of the put option created by deposit insurance and increase the value of the call option associated with equity ownership. This suggests that a higher ownership position by insiders (officers and directors) results in less hedging. We use the natural logarithm of the percentage of the total shares outstanding that are owned by officers and directors as an independent variable in both the likelihood and extent of use models.
We expect a negative relation between insider ownership and hedging by BHCs. Ownership by Institutional Blockholders. Institutional blockholders have incentive to monitor the firm's management due to the large ownership stake they have in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Whidbee and Wohar (1999) argue that these investors will have imperfect information and will most likely be concerned about the bottom line performance of the firm. Therefore, we expect that as institutional investors' stakes in the firm increase, there should be a greater likelihood of the firm hedging. We include the natural logarithm of the percentage of the total shares outstanding that are owned by all institutional investors 7 We assume here that insider ownership is predetermined with respect to hedging activity. We thank the referee for pointing this out to us.
as an independent variable and predict that the sign will be positive, with respect to the likelihood of hedging.
CEO Compensation. CEO compensation also provides its own incentives with respect to risk management. In particular, compensation with more option-like features induces management to take on more risk to increase the value of the option (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996) . Thus, we expect higher option compensation for managers to result in less hedging. We make use of three measures of CEO compensation as independent variables in our regression model: 1) annual salary, 2) annual cash bonus, and 3) value of option awards. We expect a negative relation between the value of option awards and the likelihood of hedging. Alternatively, large, fixed salaries and cash bonuses may increase the likelihood of hedging in order to decrease variability in the firm's cash flows, and thus ensure a continued stream of cash payments to the CEO. This is particularly true because the manager of the firm is likely to have little diversification in personal wealth.
There is a possibility that CEO compensation is endogenous. Successful hedging activity could indeed lead to higher executive compensation.
8
Other Managerial Incentives. We include a dummy variable that represents the existence of a director stock plan in our models to capture the effect of director ownership incentives. As with ownership by insiders, we expect an ownership stake in the firm by the directors will provide incentives to take more risk to increase the option value of the firm.
Thus, we expect the sign of the estimated coefficient for this variable to be negative.
BHC Size. We use the natural logarithm of total assets as a control variable for BHC size. Based on prior research, we expect that larger banks are more likely to be able to make the investment in intellectual capital and control systems necessary to participate in derivatives markets, and thus are more likely to be users of foreign-exchange derivatives. However, Carter and Sinkey (1998) and Gunther and Siems (2002) suggest that conditional upon the decision to be a participant in the market for derivatives, the extent of use of derivatives is not positively affected by size. In fact, the relation may even be negative. simply that the use of derivatives is associated with a higher probability of default.
Like the compensation variables, we expect leverage to be endogenously determined. Firms that are successfully hedging create more debt and thus have higher leverage, other things equal. 9 Thanks again to a referee for pointing this important point out. Leverage is thought to be be related to the scope of the firm and to the 12-month maturity mismatch (GAP). GAP is measured as assets repricing in 12 months less liabilities repricing in 12 months, scaled by total assets. The maturity mismatch is expected to impact the use of interest-rate derivatives. A larger gap means a greater effect on bank value when interest rates change, so a larger gap should lead a bank to hedge more with interest rate derivatives. We expect this to also be predetermined with respect to the decisions to hedge using foreign exchange derivatives.
Foreign Exchange Risk. A bank's use of currency derivatives should be related to its exposure to foreign exchange rate fluctuations. We use the ratio of interest income from foreign sources to total interest income to measure foreign exchange exposure. We expect that greater exposure, as represented by a larger proportion of income being derived from foreign sources, should be positively related to both the likelihood and extent of currency derivative use.
Growth Opportunities. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that hedging may alleviate the underinvestment problem by reducing the variance of cash flows. Thus, firms with more growth options are more likely to benefit from hedging. We use the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity as a proxy for growth opportunities.
Profitability. The return on equity is included to represent the profitability of the BHCs.
Empirical Results
In this section we present the results of our estimation procedure. Table 3 reports some important results from the reduced form equations. Because leverage and many of the CEO compensation variables are believed to be endogenous, instrumental variables estimation must be used to ensure consistent parameter estimates are obtained. Table   4 reports coefficient estimates for the instrumental variable estimation of the probability that a BHC will use foreign exchange derivatives for hedging. When a zero coefficient lies outside of the 90% confidence interval it is significant at the 10% level. Base salary appears to have no effect on the extent of derivative use. After dropping it from the model, larger values of CEO options are associated with lower levels of derivative use, while higher CEO bonuses increases use. Firm size, market to book 
